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Abstract
The present paper discusses an important part of the framework conditions for innovation in a
number of European countries  (France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) as
well Japan and the United States through a comparison of the development of the financial
systems in these countries. The main focus is whether a convergence can be observed between
what is traditionally perceived as market based and credit based systems respectively. Based on
quantitative statistics it is concluded that a convergence has taken place, and it is becoming
increasingly more difficult to divide national financial systems into two main categories based
on quantitative data alone. But differences still remain, and the paper continues by discussing
reasons for convergence and divergence respectively. These reasons include internationalization,
differences in industrial structure, as well as changes in national and international regulation.
Before turning to a discussion of the policy perspectives of the observed development the paper
discusses the financial systems ability to finance different types of transactions.
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A limited amount of research has been carried out within this area despite the fact that it is widely recognized
that innovation financing is very important in promoting innovation. Although there has been some
contributions (e.g. Prakke, 1988; Dosi, 1990; Christensen, 1992a and 1992b; OECD, 1993; OECD, 1996) most
of these are limited in scope and/or focus on a specific set of problems like the development of the venture
capital industry. 
1. Financing Innovations - the Role of the Institutional Set-Up
The ambition of the present paper is to explore the institutional framework for innovation
financing as expressed by the financial system.
1 Different financial systems support different
types of investments differently. 
The process of European integration and the consequences for innovation have been investigated
previously (see e.g. Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the present paper we highlight some of the
basic properties and changes of financial systems in the past decade in order to investigate if a
similar integration process is going on with respect to financial systems. The general belief is that
many European countries have moved towards the American/British type of financial system and
vice versa. In other words it is assumed that there is a convergence trend for financial systems.
This paper will look further at this convergence trend: Are there limits to this convergence, and
if so, what are the reasons for these limitations? We will also deal with the pros and cons of
convergence in a discussion of whether such a thing as a best practice can be identified.
Our method to explore these questions is first to consider the quantitatively measurable
differences between national financial systems in section 2 in order to empirically investigate the
tendencies for convergence. Section 3 continues with a discussion of why differences between
financial systems continues to exist, even though there are clear signs of some degree of
convergence. Finally, in section 4, we discuss possible best practices of financial systems with
respect to innovation financing by differentiating between different kinds of transactions,
different types of firms and different types of capital. In this section we will put a special
emphasis on the characteristics of the American system with regards to innovation financing. The
paper ends up with a discussion of policy perspectives of the observed development
Before going too far in policy recommendations one should bear in mind that financing
innovation is not the only task of the financial system - far from it. But given the increasing
importance of firms not being static in a dynamic world, and given the importance of innovation2
2 We thank John Zysman for comments on this section.
3 France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. Germany, which is traditionally considered as being
credit based, is not included due to lack of detailed data.
in growth and job creation, governments are interested in promoting innovations.  Precisely what
type of financial system Europe needs in order to promote innovations is an important policy
issue. Is there really such a thing as a ‘best practice’, or should financial systems entail several
of the features of both the American type and Continental European type systems in order to
improve the dynamics and limit sensibility the of the system?
2. A Picture of Financial Systems
2
In this section we shall take a closer look upon differences between national financial systems.
After a mainly quantitative description of differences between national financial systems in some
major European countries
3 and the US and Japan, we turn to discuss qualitative features of
different systems in section 3.
Financial systems are traditionally divided into two main types (Zysman, 1983; OECD, 1993):
i) a system based on capital markets, and
ii) a credit based system.
In a stylized capital market based system stocks and bonds are said to be relatively important
long-term financing sources for firms. In such a system the central function of bank lending is to
serve short-term purposes. Borrower and lender often meet across competitive markets with the
help of intermediary institutions. Entrance to and exit from different financial holdings are quite
simple processes, making this the most common ways for lenders to execute their influence.
In a stylized credit based system capital markets play a relatively weak role in providing long-
term capital compared to financial institutions. In credit based systems there are fewer
arrangements for an easy exit, which makes financial institutions more loyal to their borrowers.3
Table 2.1: A static typology of national financial systems
Major grouping Market based Credit based
Countries US, UK, Netherlands  Japan, France, Italy, Spain
Debt/equity ratio in firms Relatively low Relatively high
Major financing
instruments
Retained earnings and, to a lesser
extent, bonds and new equity issues
Loans and retained earnings
Price mechanism of
capital allocation




Consequently, “voice” is the common way for lenders to execute influence in customer
companies (Zysman, 1983, p. 70-72). 
In relation to innovation financing, venture capital is typically an important source of funding for
high risk/uncertain projects in the market based systems. In the credit based systems, intra-
preneurship (entrepreneurs inside companies, i.e. internal financing) and/or bank consortia play
a major role in providing risk capital (OECD, 1993, p. 69).
The purpose of the present section is to explore  whether it is possible to find distinctive features
of national financial systems as described in table 2.1, and whether the differences between the
systems have changed in the past decade.
The countries included in the analysis are divided into the two major groupings on the basis of
their characteristics in the initial stage of the period analyzed.
2.1. The Importance of Debt and Bank Credits in Financing Firms
The first feature mentioned in table 2.1 is the debt/equity-ratio. The debt/equity-ratio in credit
based financial systems is relatively higher than in market-based systems due to assumed close
relationships between lenders and borrowers, and due to the fact that some firms have difficult
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Figure 2.1: Debt/Equity Ratio in Firms
Calculated from OECD, Financial Statistics, part III, 1993-1996.
firms a higher debt/equity ratio because monitoring of firms is easier and more necessary
(Christensen, 1992a, p. 151).
Figure 2.1 reveals that the difference in debt/equity ratios between the major European countries
and the US and Japan has decreased since the mid-80's. Looking at the initial capital structure the
US starts out with a very low debt to equity ratio, which is characteristic for market based
systems, but increases the ratio from 0,5 to 1 from the early/mid-1980's to the early/mid-1990's.
The debt to equity ratio in the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom varies between 1 and
1,5. For the Netherlands and the United Kingdom this, combined with the fact that bank financing
amount to just 10-15 per cent of total liabilities in these countries, indicates a market based
structure. Spain has a debt-equity rate which is almost as low as for the Netherlands and United
Kingdom,  but bank and trade credits account for 40 per cent of total liabilities, which indicates
a quite strong credit orientation. 
Italy and Japan have very high debt-equity ratios is the early 1980's, and continue to be well above
the other countries throughout the period. The number of years available for France is restricted,5
4
An economic factor behind the tendency towards a decreasing debt to equity ratio in the majority of countries
is a decreasing  ratio of inflation in the 1980's in all countries involved in the analysis (OECD, 1996). The
tendency is expected to continue due to an increased demand for security - as expressed by low debt/equity
ratios - from banks in their loan policies after a number of bank failures in the early 90's.
but in the first half of the 1990's the ratio is close to the Spanish and moving closer to the market
based countries.
The general picture is one of convergence where countries starting out with a high debt to
equity ratio experiences an increase in equity, which reduces the debt to equity ratio,
4 while the
US, which has the lowest debt/equity ratio during the whole period, experiences an increase in
the ratio due to a stagnation in equity and a moderate increase in debt. In the middle group are
the UK and Netherlands, where debt and equity have had parallel growth rates in the observed
period.
A second factor determining patterns of financial systems is the major financing instruments.
According to table 2.1 loans are a major source of capital in credit-based systems, while it, apart
from retained earnings, is bonds and new equity issues, which are the most important financing
instruments in market based systems.
Figure 2.2 shows the relative importance of bank credits in financing industry measured as short
and long term bank credits as a percentage of the total liabilities. A high percentage of bank
credits indicates a financial system oriented towards credit, while a low percentage indicates
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Figure 2.2: The Relative Importance of Bank Credits in Financing Industry
Calculated from OECD, Financial Statistics, part III, 1993-1996.
With the exception of Japan, which is in a category of its own with regards to the relative
importance of bank credits, the difference between the countries has diminished since the mid-
80's.  The decreasing importance of back credit in France, Spain and, to a lesser degree, Italy
(i.e. countries with credit based systems) is due to either a stagnation or slow growth in bank
credits, while the US and, to a lesser degree the Netherlands, with their market dominated
systems, have had a higher growth  rate of bank credits compared to liabilities. The tendency
for the UK, which started out with a relatively high importance of bank credit considering the
status as a market based system, is less clear since the lack of data from 1990 and onwards
makes it impossible to determine whether the growth in the relative importance of bank credits
in the late 1980's is a lasting tendency.
Capital markets play a relatively weak role in providing long-term capital compared to financial
institutions in credit based systems. Statistics on the share of long term bank credits to total
liabilities (figure 2.3) show that the tendency of convergence, which was evident from figure
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Figure 2.3: The Share of Long Term Bank Credits to Total Liabilities
Calculated from OECD, Financial Statistics, part III, 1993-1996.
except for the case of Japan and France, who seem to have followed a common trend through
the last years which is markedly different from the other countries.
The overall development in the figures indicates that the countries traditionally characterized
as having credit based financial systems, with the exception of Japan, are moving towards a
situation with less importance played by long-term bank credits. This is a consequence of bank
credits playing a diminishing overall role since an analysis of bank credits alone show that long-
terminism is being more predominant. Thus it is becoming increasingly more difficult to divide
national financial systems into categories according to the importance of debt and bank credits
in financing firms. Japan clearly has an exceptional system with bank credits playing a
proportionally large role in financing firms, but in the Western world the picture is becoming
increasingly more blurred. It is worth noticing though, that it is not only the traditionally credit
based systems that are changing with regards to the role played by debt and bank credits, also
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Figure 2.4: Size of Equity Markets: Domestic Equity (Value at Year End) to GDP (Percentage)
Calculated from European Stock Exchange Statistics, Annual Reports 1992-1997, Eurostat, Yearbook 1997, and
International Federation of Stock Exchange Statistics.
Data for the US and Japan are only available for the most recent year.
2.2 Equity Markets
Debt and bank credits are just one side of the story about characteristics of financial systems,
the other side being equity markets. As illustrated in table 2.1, equity issues is a financing
instrument, which is used as a supplement to retained earnings in raising capital in a market
based system, i.e. equity markets play a more dominant role in market based systems as
compared to credit based systems.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the size of the equity markets in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain,
Italy and France by measuring the domestic equity  in relation to GDP. Data are only available
for the US and Japan for 1996.
UK stands out with a value of domestic equity which exceeded the value of the GDP in 1993
and has remained larger than GDP in the following years. The high level of domestic equity in
the UK is in accordance with the low debt to equity ratio illustrated in figure 2.1.
Another indicator verifies the impression from figure 2.4: The UK equity market is the fastest
growing market. Figure 2.5 show a growth rate which has risen dramatically since 1992. The
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Figure 2.5: Growth of Domestic Equity markets (No. of New Domestic Companies to Total no. of
Domestic Companies Listed)
European data calculated from European Stock Exchange Statistics, Annual Reports 1990-1997.
Data for US and Japan calculated from International Federation of Stock Exchanges Statistics.
Dutch and Spanish cases after very high growth ratios in the late 1980's. It should be noted that
the growth rates for in particular Spain, Italy and France, due to the small sizes of their markets,
are very sensitive to small absolute changes in the number of  firms. The equity market in Japan
is rather big when considering the importance of bank credits in the Japanese system.
The fact that UK has the most developed equity market is in accordance with the traditional
separation between market based and credit based financial systems. The relatively large size
of the equity market in the Netherlands and the United States also confirms the findings in
section 2.1.
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 only includes  the formal, listed equity markets. Data for the trade with
parallel and unlisted securities, which can be of equally great importance for firms needing
finance for innovative activities, are not available for a longer period of time. Therefore nothing
can be concluded on the development of these markets. But important lessons can still be drawn
from the parallel and unlisted securities transactions. It is e.g. interesting to learn that 50% of
companies which had shares traded in France in 1991 were to be found on the unlisted or10
5 Calculated from European Stock Exchange Statistics, Annual Report 1993.
parallel markets. For the Netherlands the percentage was 25, the UK and Italy were just below
20%, while companies on parallel or unlisted markets account for less than 1 percent in Spain.
5
There is no obvious relation between the size of the listed securities markets and the extent of
parallel and unlisted trade. Likewise there are no common characteristics of the relation
between unlisted and listed markets for the credit based systems. If we stick to absolute
numbers the number of companies with unlisted and parallel trade with shares on the British
market is by far the largest, just as is the case with the listed market.
A serious limitation of this section is that data are only available for the US and Japan for 1996
and 1997. Thus it is difficult to say something about a tendency of convergence. From the
limited data available though it seems that the differences between market and credit based
systems are more obvious and lasting when studying equity markets compared to the role of
bank credits studied in section 2.1.
2.3 Integration and Internationalization
We now turn to the internationalization of the financial markets. The introduction of the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 marked the beginning of a process of deregulation
and integration through diminishing capital control in Europe. An aimed consequence of the
deregulation is that the role played by market mechanisms in determining where economic
agents chose to invest and obtain their capital is strengthened. Controls on deposit and lending
rates have been relaxed and most controls of foreign currency transactions and international
capital movements have been lifted. OECD (1993, p. 43) views liberalization and globalization
as enhancing the overall efficacy and flexibility of the financial systems and as introducing
more uniformity into national financing conditions.
The fact that most countries have experienced an increasing internationalization of bank credits
(figure 2.6) indicates that internationalization and integration has played a role in the
development of the credit markets in the past decade. But bank credit is still largely a national
affair, especially for the larger countries, while the Netherlands have experienced a drastic
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Figure 2.6: Cross-Border Bank Credit to Nonbanks by Residence of Borrower (Percentage
of GDP) 
Calculated from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1995 and OECD,
National Accounts, Main Aggregates, 1960-1994.
The time series available for internationalisation of equity markets (fig. 2.7) are shorter than for
bank credits, and this hampers the possibilities of analysing the tendency over a longer period
of time. Again it is the smallest country, the Netherlands, which shows the highest degree of
internationalisation with almost half of the companies listed on the national securities markets
being foreign, while the United Kingdom and France have 20 to 30 per cent foreign companies
listed on their national securities markets. The American market is numerically very large but
it is only moderately internationalised. Foreign companies play a disappearingly small role in
Spain and Italy where the equity markets are quite small and undeveloped, as well as in Japan
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Figure 2.7: No. of foreign Companies to Total no. of Companies Listed on National Securities
Markets.
European data calculated from European Stock Exchange Statistics, Annual Report 1990-1997.
Data for US and Japan calculated from International Federation of Stock Exchanges Statistics.
2.4 Differences still persist
The above analysis shows that even though there are reminiscences of two distinctive types of
financial systems, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to divide national financial systems
into two main categories according to their orientation towards either market transactions or
bank credit based on quantitative statistics alone: Both means of raising funds are present in all
countries, and there are tendencies of increasing importance of credit in traditional market based
systems, and increasing importance of market transactions in traditional credit based systems.
In relation to innovation the set-up of the financial system determines important parts of the
framework conditions for innovation financing. The macro conditions affect the micro behavior,
thus the set-up of the financial system influences the behavior in relation to investment in
innovation. One factor that is often mentioned as crucial for innovation investment is the exit
possibilities for early stage investors. If early stage investors do not have a possibility of pulling
out of their investments when a more mature phase is reached, it has two possible effects: Funds
that could otherwise have been moved into other seed-investment projects are “occupied”; and
the willingness to engage in early stage investments in the first place may be effected in a
negative direction, if the investor has very few possibilities of exit, and thus only have the13
option of engaging in a long-term commitment. A developed market for both listed and unlisted
securities is traditionally perceived as one of the best guarantees for exit possibilities. On the
other hand, close and stable relations between borrower and lender in a credit based system
have been praised for making e.g. banks more willing to engage in long-term credit provision
for uncertain projects. Thus even though it is not possible a priori to determine whether a
market system is “better” than a credit based system in relation to innovation financing, the two
types of systems provide quite different frameworks for innovation financing.
Even though the distinction between market and credit based systems is becoming increasingly
more blurred differences still occur, and internationalization has not lead to a total integration
of financial markets across borders. And a one-sided movement by the credit based systems
towards the American and British type of system cannot be observed, it is rather a case of both
types of systems increasing their use of financing means characteristic of their counterpart. In
light of possibilities for innovative firms to have their investment plans financed, the crucial
question is then whether the convergence process has enhanced the merits of each of the two
systems. That is, has e.g. long term commitment increased in market based systems, and have
exit possibilities improved in credit based systems? In order to fully answer this question,
further - both quantitative and qualitative - data generation is needed, which is beyond the limits
of this paper.
Even though there are signs of convergence between national financial systems in quantitative
statistics, this cannot be perceived as the total picture of the development of the national
financial systems though. 
An illustration of qualitative institutional differences is the venture capital industry in Japan,
which appear to engage heavily in lending. Actually much of what is characterized as venture
capital in Japanese statistics is long term debt. This illustrates that even though the statistics on
financial systems show convergence between nations, there may still be differences in the
functioning of financial markets and financial systems. Even equity organizations in
credit-based financial systems may have features stemming from the nature of the credit-based
financial system. The reasons why differences still occur are discussed in the following section.14
3. Explaining the Differences
Above we have shown that differences between financial systems diminish although they are
still there. But we have not explained neither why the differences seem to be still smaller nor
why they have not completely disappeared in the past decade. This section attempts to answer
these questions.
3.1 Reasons for Convergence
A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that financial systems converge and many claim
that they will continue to do so. Arguments for this point of view are based on the trend towards
internationalization in general. That is, it is claimed that information technologies render the
opportunities for financial institutions to do their trade more or less borderless and around the
clock. In addition, the information technology facilitates the introduction and use of financial
innovations which often come about as a reaction to regulations. 
Very often it is claimed that deregulation is a major force behind convergence. However, careful
studies of the development in regulations suggests that what has happened is rather a re-
regulation. This means that some regulations have disappeared but others have emerged. In
other words a reshuffling of the areas subject to regulation has taken place. In general
quantitative controls have been relaxed and the focus of government intervention is now more
on support of markets and price setting. This has increased competition at the same time as
government intervention has increased  (see e.g. Vogels (1996)). Deregulation in itself can
therefore not explain convergence.
A second argument for why financial systems converge is the growth of multinationals. These
firms are able to reshuffle their capital between divisions and raise capital on financial markets
abroad (cf. the increasing amount of cross-border credits displayed in figure 2.7). Some of them
even issue their own commercial papers. The growing importance of these multinationals
relative to the total capital contribute to wipe out differences between financial systems and
make financing sources for these firms more global.
Thirdly, not only the cross-border trade with physical products and related monetary transfers
have increased. Especially the pure monetary transfers have increased. One of the reasons15
6
For example, differences in interest rates between the U.S. and Japan has in 1996 and 1997 been fairly constant
at approximately 3½ pct.points.
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In the historical evolution of financial systems we may find explanations to why the systems are structured the
way they are today. For example, in a long-term historical perspective the industry in both the U.S. and the U.K.
were more interlinked with banks than nowadays. However, the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S. in 1933,
following the Wall Street collapse made American banks much less involved with firms. Similarly, the British
banks desisted from long-term lending to industry after the collapse of some of the major banks in the 1870s.
This historical explanation to why systems differ could be expanded. Thus, not only single events but also less
visible, cultural differences are important. History matters in the shaping of these differences. This is however,
not the place to make such an expansion. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the development of the
systems during the past 10-15 years.
behind this trend is a general increase in risk and a derived wish to use hedging instruments and
to diversify portfolios on assets in several countries. The possibilities of this have been
facilitated by the development of information technologies.
Finally, it should be mentioned that entry of foreign financial institutions has increased in a long
time perspective. This trend has though been more or less intense depending on the part of the
financial sector and time period in question. The insurance companies have managed to
establish retail networks in many countries as opposed to the mortgage business. The banking
sector has tried an internationalisation process but has withdrawn these activities in the first half
of the 1990s. Now it seems as if a number of banks are trying again although this is mainly in
whole sale international financial services. International expansion in retail financial services
is very limited as explained in further detail in the next section. 
3.2  Reasons for Divergence
Differences between financial systems today may be explained by factors related to both the
quantitative character of the society of which the financial system is a part but also to the nature
of the financial system itself. As illustrated above there are still differences between nations
although these have diminished. One indication is that there are enduring, significant interest
rate differentials between nations
6. In the following we shall discuss some explanations to why
there are differences. These explanations will not so much be related to the specific nations
although we recognize there may be specific events in the nations which are important in such
an explanation
7. 16
Some of the most important reasons why there are limits to the convergence process are the
following.  First of all there are hindrances to a physical establishment of financial institutions
abroad. These hindrances include entry costs (building up reputation, knowledge about tax
system, legislation and customers)  - costs that are substantial for banks in foreign markets -
especially in small markets. In particular, customers confidence in foreign banks has proven to
be smaller than in a domestic bank. This links to another hindrance which is the funding of the
financial institution. Most often access to first order savings are restricted for foreign banks who
then have to rely on funding in their home market. 
Furthermore, in some countries the structural characteristics of the national industry may be a
barrier for foreign banks. For example, a relatively large number of small and medium sized
firms mean high costs on monitoring and credit judgement compared to the volume of lending.
Furthermore asymmetries in information is likely to be higher when operating in new, foreign
markets. Finally, an increasing number of firms wants non-standardized services. Industrial
finance is thus both labour-intense and is subject to severe limits to produce the services in a
standardized, central manner. This in turn limits the crowding-out of small, national financial
institutions by large, internationally active institutions (Vitols, 1995, p.26).
Related to this argument it is likely that differences between nations in their modes and
structures of production will mean differences in demand for types and/or amount of capital.
For example, demand for capital may be determined by the relative importance of firms who
are capital or labour intensive, knowledge based, or if they are based in industries where
physical assets can be made liquid and therefore used as collateral.
A very important reason is that - in spite of deregulation of some areas of economic activity
and harmonization - regulation of certain areas of the financial systems continue to be national.
Thus, Vitols (1995, p.6) list four areas where the state maintains significant regulatory
discretion: 
the regulation of corporate governance, which involves the relationship between financial
institutions and non-financial companies; 
the regulation of household savings, which affects financial institutions’ and non-financial
companies’ access to funds; 17
the regulation of financial sector internal governance, which affects the goals and capacities of
financial institutions; and 
the regulation of special-purpose credit institutes, which influences the risk profiles faced by
financial institutes or allow the state to directly allocate resources to the non-financial company
sector.
It seems fair to conclude that even if the data in chapter 2 indicate convergence of financial
systems, then there are reasons to believe that there are limits to this process. Moreover,
conclusions at a very aggregate level needs to be modified. Thus, there are different segments
of financial markets, each of them subject to different degrees of internationalisation. It seems
as if wholesale markets with universally tradeable securities are largely international, although
generally mostly accessible by large firms and governments. These globally traded financial
products include foreign exchange (included various hedging instruments), large corporate
loans, stock and bond trading, major corporate insurance risks and commodity trading (Morgan
and Knights, 1997, p.6). Although these financial markets are often referred to as “global” they
are only truly global in one sense of the word, that is prices are set at a global scale and all
financial institutions may participate in the market place. But they are not global in geographical
terms. In fact, these markets are largely confined to only a few market places, notably London,
New York and Tokyo, secondarily Paris and Frankfurt.
Retail markets, on the other hand, persist to be national. This has been discussed above:
regulations, distribution patterns and consumer habits vary between countries. In particular the
latter explanation - consumer habits - is powerful. This is exemplified by the fact that The
European Union has provided legislation for financial institutions to operate on equal terms in
markets abroad. However, only a few financial institutions have become truly international in
retail financial services.
3.3. Regulation of Financial Systems
A further aspect of regulation is how efficient regulation is in the first place. Seen from a policy
perspective it is of utmost importance to what extend regulation is able to change financial
systems. Opinions on this issue differ a lot and has done so for long. Thus, Cox (1986, p.14-15)
argues that truly, as Zysman (1983) pointed out, governments have to recognize that the18
structure of financial systems is a constraint on implementation of policies. The scope of
possible policies is limited by the existing institutional set-up of financial systems and policies
that are not compatible with this set-up are likely to render disfunctional political conflicts and
failure of industrial policy. This allow us to some extent to understand the relative economic
successes of post-war Japan, Sweden, France and West Germany. As Cox mentions
"These countries have fashioned policies which have not challenged the structure of
the financial system. Other countries - Britain in particular - have attempted to
implement industrial policies without the requisite financial structure of controls to
facilitate a positive state role, and this has led to disfunctional and economically
wasteful political conflict." (ibid., p.14)
But Zysman and Cox do not agree on a fundamental causality in this regard. Whereas Zysman
argues that for instance France and Japan have state-led economies due to their credit based,
government influenced financial systems, Cox reverses the argument. In his view the credit
based, government influenced financial systems in Japan and France are results of a deliberate
choice to have state-led economies. The U.S. and the U.K. have capital market systems because
they choose not to be state-led economies.
Probably the truth is somewhere in between these arguments. The financial system should not
be viewed as an immutable, constraining entity. Governments have scope for changing financial
systems and adjust financial institutions to industrial policy rather than adjusting policies to the
structures of financial systems. But, on the other hand, such a change does not take place over
night. Financial systems have grown in importance relative to the rest of the economy in most
of the western economies, and the private part of the financial markets has grown relative to the
central banks. In addition, financial systems have become more interrelated than hitherto was
the case. Both these facts give a certain inertia in changing financial systems. 
Furthermore, this inertia is enhanced by a financial system lock-in effect. This effect has to do
with the development of competence and division of labour within financial institutions. If a
certain kind of transaction frequently occurs in one type of system, competences and economies
of scale in undertaking this transaction will improve further, enhancing competitiveness in that19
particular business. Implementing policies that requires new kinds of transactions may be costly
because it takes time to build competence in undertaking these transactions efficiently. 
Having said this about regulation it is clear that national regulation and legislation differ widely.
These differences have important implications for division of labour between financial
institutions, for the possibilities of exercising corporate control, for their concentration, capital-
reserve requirements and consequently for their industrial investments. In general the capital
market oriented financial systems, notably the U.S., impose the most extensive restrictions on
banking. The U.K. have a number of restrictions on the market for corporate control. It may
sound a bit paradoxical that market oriented systems have such extensive regulations but it
reflects that a well-functioning "pure" market requires the establishing of well-defined rules of
the game. The Japanese banking sector is also heavily regulated - probably even more regulated
than the U.K. banks.
Deregulation may really have negative effects on the financing of corporate investments, but
deregulation may also be an advantage. It depends on the specific type of regulation and the
specific area which is regulated. As already mentioned regulations exist on how much financial
institutions are allowed to be involved in industrial firms. Experience from Germany with
universal banking and heavy involvement of banks in non-financial enterprises are of course
not completely paritive, but nevertheless it has been claimed throughout the literature that this
experience indicates that borrower-lender relationships are enhanced, which in turn may
facilitate financing of industrial firms, in particular these cases where assessment of the
management team and the future prospects of the firm is essential because collateral cannot be
provided, or because assessment of the intangible investments in the firm is relatively difficult
without knowing the firm in more detail. 
Thus, the ability of German financial institutions to provide firms with long-term debt financing
is beyond question. However, there is research indicating that this may be ascribed not only to
the nature of the relationships between banks and non-financial enterprises but also to the20
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Vitols (1995/308) claims that the regulatory framework is more important than the nature of the relationships
in this respect. On the other hand it is likely that these two explanations are intertwined.
9
Knights and Morgan (eds., 1997) is one recent collection of articles describing a number of national financial
systems.
regulatory framework.
8 It has been shown that the German banking system is in fact, strictly
regulated but regulated differently than in other countries. It has been debated in the US how
the US regulation of ownership and banking could be relaxed and it has been claimed that the
German banks lack regulations. On the contrary, the German financial sector is heavily
regulated through other regulatory mechanisms than the traditional interest rate controls and
financial market segmentation. A prudential, uniform regulation with clear quantitative
standards have privileged banks and limited price competition. This in turn, has contributed to
financial stability and long term investments (Vitols, 1995/308). In most other countries pension
funds and other institutional investors are not allowed to, or limited in, holding a substantial
equity stake in non-financial enterprises and they are criticized for being too short termed in
their investment policy. Deregulation in such areas may be a step forward with respect to
financing long-term investments. Additional explanations relate to the fact that nations differ
in the diversification of financial institutions, concentration of capital, the structures of industry
and the openness of the economy.
Although we believe that the factors pointed to above are important driving forces in the
dynamics of financial systems, then the set of explanations provided here are not giving us the
full picture for all countries. To explain the institutional set-up of a single country it is necessary
to be much more specific.
9 A further differentiation of type of transaction and type of firm to
be financed is needed.
4. Financing Different Types of Transactions
4.1. Introduction
In this section we discuss some principle modes of functioning of the financial systems and
their ability to finance different kinds of investments. We thus turn from a mainly structural21
comparison of financial systems to a view emphasizing the capacity of different financing
sources to finance different types of transactions.
More specifically, we discuss what financing mechanisms are better at financing one-time,
standard transactions versus more discretionary transactions. In table 2.1. we listed some of the
major financing instruments in a typology of financial systems. In the following we discuss the
internal finance, financing through intermediaries and financing through markets.
This discussion is used to apply the considerations in chapter 3 and this one closer to the case
of innovation financing rather than financing investments in general.
4.2. A Micro-view on Financing Different Transactions
When the financing process concern an uncertain activity agents take appropriate measures to
reduce or compensate for the uncertainty in advance. Thus, while making a contract initial
uncertainty on what is to follow is substantial. But recognizing that the contract is "incomplete"
at the outset, in the sense that not all possible future states of nature are taken into account,
makes agents ensure that contracts can be adapted to changing conditions.
The purpose of investment determines the degree of incompleteness of contracts and the likely
needs for ex post adjustments. For example, the degree of asset specificity has an impact on
whether there is a secondary market for the assets and consequently how worthy they are as
collateral. The increasingly large proportion of human capital in production is one example of
such specific assets which will induce a high degree of discretionary contracting. Another
example is the one-time type of transaction. A third example is innovations, especially more
radical innovations. 
If a certain type of transaction occurs frequently, the skills to evaluate its likely outcome cost
effectively are often available or are generated over time, while the unfamiliar kinds of
transaction may incur greater costs for screening and monitoring than anticipated (Neave, 1991,
p.27). Learning by doing is, in other words, important as a means of reducing costs in
transactions in that some kinds of transactions may be subject to standardization of screening22
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Another strategy is to specialize in order to screen only a few types of transactions and to accumulate
knowledge in this special activity within the organization.
techniques while other, less frequently occurring transactions, like financing of innovations,
may need discretionary treatment.
Whether one or another kind of transaction is regularly occurring or not depends on the specific
institutional surroundings. The traditions and production structure of the national industry are
thus contributing to what are the most common kinds of transactions. Financiers are likely to
be reluctant to enter unfamiliar transactions unless they are relatively certain on the outcome
or, the outcome seems to be well over average. Competition may force financial institutions to
minimise operating costs and this is mainly possible in familiar transactions
10.
Capabilities to handle these different kinds of transactions differ according to which type of
financing mechanism is chosen. In general, the more transactions are characterized by
uncertainty and discretion then the more screening and monitoring capabilities are needed
(Williamson, 1988). Vice versa frequently occurring standard transactions under risk need
limited screening and monitoring, and learning effects are reduced to a minimum.
The market based way of financing implies the least developed governance capabilities as
continuous supervision is difficult when buyers and sellers in the market are anonymous and
dealing on a once and for all basis. The standardized way of trading and the small amount of
screening and monitoring possibly make the market way of financing superior in terms of costs.
Calculable, homogeneous and simple forms of transactions are thus channelled through this
market.
In contrast, financing by intermediaries or internal financing provides greater capabilities for
learning and ex post adjustment of the incomplete contracts resulting from uncertainty. In an
intermediary or internally in an organization both initial screening procedures and subsequent23
11
In principle differences between the intermediary way and the internal way of financing are smaller than those
between markets and intermediaries. However, there is a difference, mostly a matter of degree, between
capabilities for continuously monitoring. Another difference is that opportunistic behaviour is less likely to
occur and presumably is less costly when it does. Finally, internal financing rules out any legal problems
connected to ex post adjustment.
monitoring and reporting requirements are more thorough than in the corresponding market
governance mechanism.
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Arguments on relationship banking vis a vis arms-length financing in the literature thus points
to fundamental differences in these two financing mechanisms ability to support different kinds
of transactions.
In summation, the preliminary conclusion from the above is that intermediaries or internal
financing are the most relevant mechanisms of financing when investing in discretionary
investments like innovations because they are better capable dealing with uncertainty compared
to the market way of financing. However, it matters if the innovation in question is radically
new or if its a minor change, and it matters if the innovation is based upon intangibles which
are visible for the market or if it requires a more detailed knowledge of the investments in the
firm (marketing and tooling-up expenses are examples of innovation costs which are difficult
to assess whereas R&D-expenditures is more visible to the business analyst). 
In industries such as pharmaceuticals R&D is a large share of innovation costs and radicality
is often high, which means that prior knowledge of establishments is at best sparse. It may even
be argued that it is advantageous if there are no established routines of financing such ventures
as conservatism may be particular damaging towards such major shifts in technology. Well-
established screening and monitoring capabilities could thus tend to be hostile to financing
more radical, new innovations. Thus, it could be argued that  to the market based financing
mechanism do not produce rigidity in financing new start-ups based on high technology. In
contrast, credit-based financing is better suited for financing innovations in industries such as
mechanical engineering where innovation costs is more integrated with other production costs,
and therefore less visible. The market based countries, the U.S. and the U.K., are strong in
pharmaceuticals, whereas Japan, Germany and Sweden are strong in mechanical engineering.24
However, this conclusion is too general, and may produce odd results if standing alone. For
example, venture capital institutions are often said to undertake thorough screening and
monitoring of firms. However, venture capital is common exactly in countries with a market
based financial system (U.K., U.S., Netherlands). Explaining this seemingly paradox must take
three things into account. First, the proportions of the financial systems are important. Thus, in
all countries venture capital firms finance only a fraction of investments. Secondly, the actual
behaviour of financial institutions is important. Although quantitative information on the
different systems may reveal certain differences (an issue dealt with in section 2) it may be that
the qualitative aspects of the financial institutions modify the picture. Thirdly, it is important
to stress that there are complementarities between the two ways of financing. Financial
institutions like venture capital firms, may help the firm to grow to a stage where market based
financing becomes relevant. In other words both market-based and credit-based financing
mechanisms co-exists in each nation and seen in a dynamic perspective they are often both part
of a firms financing sources. The specific combination of markets and institutions is a result of
the historical evolution of e.g. the financial regulation, production structure, division of labour
between financing mechanisms.
In addition, some of the drawbacks of close relationships should be pointed to:
From the point of view of society one could ask: If closer relationships were induced by
increased equity participation in industrial firms by financial institutions (cf. the German model,
where banks are allowed to hold large equity stakes in firms and the influence on these firms
is particular large and enhanced by the proxy vote system), would, then, the overall fragility of
the financial system increase as a result? Some observers claim so. Another disadvantage of
such relationships could be an increased concentration of economic power which may be
politically undesirable. It could also be argued that most likely this step would require an
increased number of bank supervisors and administration.
One could also ask if well-established relationships prevent an optimal allocation of capital?
If some of the lending is more or less automatically directed to the firms inside established
relationships, then the capital may be scarce for firms outside such relationships, which
alternatively might have grown into more successful firms and rendered more employment. This
may also have consequences for the build-up of competencies. In a volatile industrial25
12   Another explanation could be that business angels finance a substantial part of such new ventures.
Financing by business angels is very much hands-on and non-market ways of financing, but it may be an
important financing source before the firm is ready for market-based financing.
environment it is necessary to have a feeling for possible directions of change. However, if
financial institutions spend many of their resources on maintaining old relationships it may be
that they loose the insight in recent trends in production outside these relationships and this may
harm the evolutionary viability of the industry. This has exactly been the traditional arguments
why the U.S. financial system may be able to finance new, risky ventures in spite of its mainly
market based character.
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5. Conclusions and Policy Perspectives
A central theme in the above discussion has been the ability of financial systems to enhance
processes at a micro-level, which are beneficial for innovation financing. More specifically it
has been argued that the intrinsic uncertainty in innovations, the importance of interactive
learning processes and the tacit knowledge in innovation, points to the need for some degree
of relationship banking. Similar arguments has been put forward previously. For instance Colin
Mayer (1988, p.1183) claimed that
"The distinctive feature of successful financial systems is their close involvement in
industry. A primary characteristic of a market based system is an arm's length relation
between investor and firm. There are well documented exceptions, but the basic
requirement of a market, that investors be treated equally, acts against the close
involvement of any one party. ... The fundamental challenge that faces any institution
or government that can affect the practice of finance is to encourage the emergence of
closer relationships and to direct the wealth of talent that has now been concentrated
in British financial institutions into direct participation in corporate activities. In the
process, the apparent attractions of intensifying competition in financial markets may
have to be resisted. The benefits of competition may only be attained at the expense
of longer term economic prosperity."
Also some recommendations for changing the U.S. financial system go in this direction. For
example, a two-year research project by 25 leading U.S. experts pointed to removal of26
restrictions on ownership in general, and more specifically it was suggested that restrictions
should be removed on joint ownership of debt and equity. Thus, financial institutions should
according to this suggestion, be allowed to hold equity for investment purposes in companies
to which they provide debt financing (Porter, 1992). It was furthermore suggested that
interactions between capital providers and firms are not productive and should be improved:
“Current interactions between institutional investors and managements are too often
cat-and-mouse games played around guessing next period’s earnings. What is needed
instead are substantive discussions about the long-run competitive position of the
company.” (Ibid., p.80)
However, it could be questioned if deficiencies in the financial systems such as short-term
pressures on investments, should justify systemic changes. For example, could interaction
between borrowers and lenders be enhanced within the institutional and regulatory framework,
or are these interactions too dependent upon the general institutional framework?
It is a key argument in the section on driving forces behind convergence/divergence of financial
systems, that demand for capital is determined in part by the structure and development of
production. This means that the divergence in modes of production may limit convergence of
financial systems, vice versa convergence in production may also enhance convergence of the
financial systems. However, the convergence of financial systems without links to development
of production, is in the long run likely to render dysfunctional financial systems, at least seen
from the perspective of financing innovation.
Therefore a universal best practise may not exist as different financing mechanisms are suitable
for different types of transactions and firms in different countries. We therefore also argue that
it is important to have a differentiated view on financial systems. Generalizations of the ability
of financial systems to finance innovations are likely to render conclusions which are too naive.
Instead it is important to recognize that some types of investments for example innovations are
best supported financially in one way and others by means of different financing types.27
It should also be noted that financial systems are diverse. Not only are some of the qualitative
features of financial systems hidden in the general statistics as explained in section 2. Also there
are features of financing industrial development usually found in credit-based financial systems
that exists in market-based systems. For example, some firms in the U.K. have close
relationships to one bank, who also see financing that customer as a long-term commitment to
support the firm also in times of crises. Vice versa some financial institutions in the credit-based
systems (notably pension funds) act more or less as a one-off relationship (traders in shares
rather than investors) and banks seek to lend only against collateral rather than the future
prospects of the firm and the abilities of the management team. 
This behaviour tend to vary over time. For example, banks in Denmark intensified the
relationships to firms from the mid-1980s to beginning of 1990s, partly as a result of fierce
competition. But huge losses in the banking sector in general (something not specific to
Denmark) made many banks change strategy from relationship banking towards more one-off
based transactions. This change in strategy was particularly in the small firms segment who
experienced increased requirements to collateral and worse personal service in the bank.
Consequently the firms began to “shop around” to a larger extent.
The fact that recent studies of innovation activity show that innovation is very different across
different size groups and in particular across sectors put more macrooriented policies within this
area into perspective. Seen from the perspective of innovation financing the arguments above
points to the need for a much more disaggregated policy where for example sectoral differences
in innovation processes - and different needs for financial support - are taken into account. This
point is reinforced if we adopt the argument above that market-based financial systems have
merits in financing high-tech, radically new ventures, whereas credit-based systems may be
more suitable for financing continuos, incremental innovations. At a sectoral level the
differences could be said to be the ability of market-based systems to stimulate the upspring of
new sectors in contrast to the ability of credit-based systems to restructure and strengthen
existing sectors. On the other hand it indicates that policies at an EU-level could be difficult
should there be a policy for all European firms regardless of the location and type of firm.28
Having said this we should recall that determining exactly what is the need for policies is not
possible ex ante. But policy makers nevertheless put up both regional, national and super-
national programmes for supporting innovation financially. It is widely held in policy circles
that there is a market failure with respect to equity finance for small, innovative firms and that
some level of effort is necessary. Thus, in The Green Paper of The Commission  actions are
proposed at both National and Community level. At the national level its is proposed to develop
mechanisms for innovation risk insurance especially for technology based firm and encouraging
banks to provide long-term loans, including equity loans and to establish partnerships with
expert bodies in appraising innovation projects, i.e. expanding the banks competence in relation
to innovation financing. Also the need for promoting informal venture capital is included in the
proposals by the Commission. The development of stock markets, both national and pan-
European, is to be facilitated through directives removing remaining obstacles. Finally different
types of funds are suggested at the Community level. On the macro policy level, appropriate
fiscal treatments of investments, tax reliefs etc. is recommended (p. 42-4).
The Commission acknowledges that the answer to the innovation financing problem is not to
be found in either a credit based or a market based financial system, but that both types of
finance has to coexist in order to provide the necessary institutional variety. We hope to have
illustrated that many things remain to be done not only in terms of further research but also in
terms of policy actions. In spite of problems with identifying the optimal level of intervention
surveys generally show a persistent finance gap, especially for innovative firms in seed and
early stages, which is likely to have severe hampering effects on industrial development. This
emphasize the importance of actions directed towards closing this particular gap. This paper has
pointed to some general guidelines for both research and policies. It has particularly emphasized
the relationship between the macro- and the microaspects of the problem.29
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The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes:
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one central empirical and policy
oriented orientation. 
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the ressource-based view (Penrose,
1959) with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic capabilities of
the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical work is to develop an
analytical understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity, organisational
change and human ressources. More insight in the dynamic interplay between these factors at
the level of the firm is crucial to understand international differences in performance at the
macro level in terms of economic growth and employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics 
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour and the
formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to develop
evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a Marshallian
evolution of the division of labour.
The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional and
sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the structure of
production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning. IO-matrixes which
include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed and supplemented by data
from case-studies and questionnaires.
Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts such as
'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to the ecological
dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and technical change in aspecified geographical space. An attempt will be made to synthesise theories of economic
development emphasising the role of science based-sectors with those emphasising learning-by-
producing and the growing knowledge-intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of
innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the specialisation in
trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare regions and
nations?
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There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the DRUID
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important is the role of DRUID as an environment which stimulates the Ph.D.-students to
become creative and effective. This involves several elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the   sister
institutions
- participation in research projects
- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to work
on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project which
covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a comparative analysis
of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects involving international co-
operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is open to host other projects as far
as they fall within its research profile. Special attention is given to the communication of
research results from such projects to a wide set of social actors and policy makers.DRUID Working Papers
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